Self-Awareness: The Neural Signature of Disturbed Self-Monitoring
A new study reveals that the illusion of feeling another person close by results from a misperception of the source and identity of sensorimotor signals of one's own body.
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Who are we? What makes us? These questions fuel fundamental debates in neuroscience. How is our self constructed? How does our mind relate us to the world surrounding us? And how do we differentiate between ourselves and others close by? In everyday life, we seem to know instantaneously and automatically how we relate to the world surrounding us; as a result, we hardly ever think about this fundamental human experience. Yet, knowing that we are the same person over time, that we are the author of our thoughts and actions, and that we are distinct from the environment are at the core of the self and self-consciousness [1] . Keeping track of the congruence between our intentions and their sensorimotor consequences is a key feature of these processes: it enables us to distinguish between events resulting from our own actions or produced by the environment and acting upon us [2] . Normal sensorimotor states are associated with congruent motor intention and multimodal sensory experience, processes closely monitored to ensure congruency. Monitoring, in this sense, is usually implicit and automatic, but it becomes conscious whenever there is a mismatch between the expected and realized sensorimotor states.
Explicit monitoring is crucial for the governance of our conscious behavior, and neurophysiological as well as functional imaging evidence implicates the prefrontal cortex as the key structure of this 'perception-action cycle' and active monitoring [3, 4] . Converging evidence for this comes from neuropsychological data obtained from patients with frontal lobe lesions who demonstrate deficits in the planning and regulation of their behavior [5, 6] . Based on such experimental and clinical data, as well as computer simulations, cognitive scientists build models of how the mind works. Such models can then be tested by relating mental faculties to distinct brain areas using neuroimaging or electrophysiology combined with lesion symptom inferences. From such reasoning, disordered self-monitoring has long been associated with one class of symptoms often observed in patients suffering from schizophrenia: it has been suggested that symptoms such as auditory hallucinations and delusion of control may result from a failure in the mechanisms by which the predicted consequences of a self-produced action are derived from an internal forward model [7] . Consistent with this suggestion, hallucinating schizophrenics show deficits in tasks that require self-monitoring [8] . A paper in this issue of Current Biology [9] now reports important findings suggesting that the strange sensation that somebody is nearby (and typically behind) when no one is actually present and hence cannot be seen -the 'feeling of presence' -is caused by misperceiving the source and identity of sensorimotor signals of one's own body.
Lesion analysis in neurological patients suggests that the feeling of presence results from focal brain interferences to three brain regions, namely temporo-parietal, insular, and particularly fronto-parietal cortex, and that its origin is typically, albeit not exclusively, epileptic [9] . On the basis of these findings, Blanke et al. [9] hypothesized that distorted sensorimotor processing may underlie feeling of presence also in healthy subjects. Compatible with this hypothesis, using a sensorimotor robot, Blanke et al. [9] were able to reliably induce a feeling of presence in healthy subjects via the generation of conflicting sensorimotor signals, incompatible with physical self-touch. The study provides insights into the functional brain processes that underlie the apparition of an alien agent, an experience that shares important aspects with positive first-rank symptoms in schizophrenia. In addition, the data support previous theories about the origin of positive schizophrenic symptoms.
''Accounts of miracles appear in many religious texts, and the evidential testimony of such testimony has long been debated. Where the historicity of such accounts is considered theologically important, scholars have been particularly concerned with their reliability. Sceptics have suggested that testimony became exaggerated over time but the nature and extent of the evidence has not allowed this hypothesis to be tested empirically.'' [10] . These opening lines of a correspondence in Nature entitled ''Unravelling the Indian rope-trick'' exemplify the problem of assessing allegedly extraordinary events: testimony of such events is chronically unreliable and empirical evidence remains elusive. When attempting to investigate a supposedly 'supernatural' phenomenon, such as the feeling of presence, one faces the very same problem: the feeling that people sometimes experience of another presence, typically behind them, is a spooky sensation. It is associated with non-scientific topics (and often also 'madness'!), and, accordingly, rarely reported voluntarily and investigated scientifically. Furthermore, the paroxysmal and fluctuating nature of the phenomenon constitutes a key challenge when studying its neural underpinnings.
Blanke et al. [9] collected, over more than fifteen (!) years, twelve neurological patients who experience the feeling of presence. Clinical data revealed that sensorimotor deficits were frequent, but not a prerequisite for the feeling of presence. Combined functional and structural neuroimaging data, as well as electrophysiological data (to determine the epileptogenic region), pointed to the insular cortex, the fronto-parietal and the temporo-parietal cortex as key brain areas for the feeling. This approach mixes different pathologies and etiologies, but given the scarcity of neurological patients reporting feeling of presence, the current patient sample constitutes the largest cohort of such patients studied in whom feeling of presence is associated with focal brain interference. A control group who do not experience the feeling of presence, but who were matched for sensorimotor deficits, revealed that fronto-parietal lesions were specific for feeling of presence.
To assess the relevance of these clinical findings for the feeling of presence occurring in healthy subjects, Blanke et al. [9] next devised a master-slave robot. Based upon, but extending, previous studies of body illusions [11] to full-body illusions and trunk stimulation, asynchronous stimulation of the subjects' back was used to generate conflicting signals incompatible with physical self-touch. Standing and blindfolded subjects moved their arms forward and thereby moved the master device in front of them. These movements were sent to the slave robot, which applied a tactile stimulus in real time to the subjects' back. Robot-strokes were applied either synchronously or asynchronously: as expected (and compatible with previous work on body illusions) synchronous, but not asynchronous, strokes resulted in the experience of the sensation of touching oneself (despite the mislocalization, note that the arm was extended forward!). In contrast, during asynchronous stimulation, subjects reported higher other-touch than self-touch and feeling of presence of someone else. The data suggest that the illusion of feeling another person close by is caused by misperceiving the source and identity of sensorimotor signals of one's own body. Taken together with the lesion data, findings reveal the neural mechanisms of feeling of presence and highlight that subtle differences are sufficient to induce reliably the experience of self versus other.
The paper by Blanke et al. [9] is a very interesting extension of the authors' previous work on out-of-body experiences. It is a wonderful demonstration of how persistence and endurance over time can eventually lead to an important scientific contribution. The results provide a mechanism for bizarre reports that previously have been considered to be non-explicable. As Elliot [12] stated in 1936 (when dismissing testimony relating to the Indian rope-trick as the product of unreliable evidence): ''.always look for a natural explanation of any phenomenon, and when one is not forthcoming, await the advent of more knowledge, confident that a normal and not supernormal explanation is always forthcoming, provided we have requisite knowledge.''
